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INTRODUCTION
T HE PAST YEAR brought interesting developments in a
number of major cases involving air carriers: a matter of first
impression that may come before the Supreme Court; decisions
interpreting the scope of the Montreal Convention and defining
the law regarding public use aircraft; and other developments in
litigation involving high-profile accidents. This article summa-
rizes these developments.
I. TOKYO CONVENTION
Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. presents an important question of
treaty interpretation affecting the ability of tens of thousands of
commercial airline crews across the country to maintain safety
and security onboard international flights.'
The Tokyo Convention of 1963, signed and ratified at a time
of increased hijackings and passenger disturbances, significantly
enhanced an aircraft captain's authority to take action against
potential threats onboard international flights.2 Specifically, the
Tokyo Convention affords immunity to the captain and the air-
line whenever the captain acts with "reasonable grounds to be-
lieve" that a passenger committed, or is about to commit, any act
that may, or does, jeopardize safety, good order, or discipline
onboard the aircraft.3 Before the Eid case came before the Dis-
trict of Nevada, no U.S. court had interpreted the meaning of
this treaty language.
On the evening of September 29, 2004, a group of Egyptian
businessmen and their wives boarded Alaska Airlines Flight 694
in Vancouver, British Columbia bound for Las Vegas, Nevada to
attend an energy convention.4 About one hour into the flight,
the captain received a call on the aircraft interphone from a
flight attendant.5 The flight attendant reported that she was
having trouble with some first-class passengers and requested
that security meet the airplane in Las Vegas.6 The captain asked
whether there was "anything urgent, anything [I] need to
know," to which the flight attendant responded that she be-
See generally Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2010).
2 See generally Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S.
219 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Tokyo Convention].
3 Id. art. 6, para. 1.
4 Eid, 621 F.3d at 862.
5 Id. at 862, 864.
6 Id. at 877 (Otero, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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lieved she had the situation under control.7 Following the con-
versation, the captain initiated cockpit lockdown procedures
and turned on the fasten seat belt sign.8
Several minutes later, the captain received a second phone
call from a flight attendant, stating she had "'lost control"' of
the first-class cabin.9 To the captain, it sounded like the flight
attendant was crying.10 At this time, the captain heard "'a
bunch of yelling and screaming coming through the inter-
phone."''' The captain confirmed with the first officer that he
too heard yelling and screaming.1 2 The captain said he "never
heard anything like that in [his] entire career."1 He "'felt that
there was a possibility that [his] airplane and [his] crew were in
jeopardy.""' 4 The captain decided to put the airplane on the
ground as soon as possible at the nearest suitable airport-
Reno, Nevada.15
After the aircraft landed in Reno, the captain and the flight
attendant met at the top of the jetway to discuss what happened
onboard.16 The flight attendant reported to the captain that
there were six first-class passengers causing a disturbance by
congregating near the cockpit door, refusing to follow flight at-
tendant instructions, and yelling at the flight attendant. 7 She
also told him that, after several verbal warnings, she gave the
passengers a written warning at which point they "'exploded."'1 8
The flight attendant also reported to the captain that the pas-
sengers told her, "'[y] ou Americans are so paranoid and all of
these safety and security regulations [are] stupid."" 9 Based on
this report, the captain asked law enforcement to remove the
passengers from the aircraft and to press charges against them.2 °








14 Id. at 887.





20 Id. at 878.
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cabin to identify the offending passengers, all of whom
deplaned.21
Respondents, who were nine of the twelve first-class passen-
gers and were traveling together as a group, sued petitioner
Alaska Airlines in Nevada federal court.22 Respondents claimed
that the airline violated its obligation under the Warsaw Conven-
tion,23 formally known as the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
which creates a cause of action against an airline for "damage
occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers" on in-
ternational flights and preempts state tort law.24 Alaska Airlines
moved for summary judgment on the Warsaw Convention claim,
contending that the Tokyo Convention provided it immunity.25
The district court granted summary judgment for Alaska Air-
lines, explaining that when a captain acts in accordance with the
Tokyo Convention, neither the captain nor the owner or opera-
tor of the aircraft may be held liable. 26 The court determined
that the captain complied with the Tokyo Convention because
"given even a cursory examination of all of the facts and circum-
stances of this matter" reasonable minds could not differ in con-
cluding that the captain had reasonable grounds for his
decision.27
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit sua sponte invited the United
States to submit an amicus brief setting forth the government's
views as to the correct application of the Tokyo Convention and
the Warsaw Convention. 2' The United States subsequently filed
a brief urging that the Tokyo Convention requires a highly def-
21 Id.
22 Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-01304-RCJ-(LRL), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45488, at *2 (D. Nev. June 15, 2006).
23 Eid, 621 F.3d at 865; see Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 649 n.5
(2004). Plaintiffs also brought supplemental state law claims for defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Eid, 621 F.3d at 865. The district
court dismissed all of respondents' state law claims as preempted by the Warsaw
Convention. Id. The district court subsequently denied respondents' motion to
file supplemental pleadings alleging seven new state causes of action. Id.
24 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
U.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (2000) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
25 Eid, 621 F.3d at 865.
26 Eid, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45488, at *14, *18.
27 Id. at *18.
28 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Eid, 621 F.3d 858 (No. 06-
16457).
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erential, review of an aircraft captain's actions.29 The court of
appeals, however, entirely ignored the position of the United
States on the correct interpretation of the Tokyo Convention. °
Accordingly, a divided court of appeals reversed the ruling that
the Tokyo Convention entitled Alaska Airlines to summary
judgment.3"
Focusing on the phrase "reasonable grounds to believe" in the
Tokyo Convention, the panel majority held that the Tokyo Con-
vention adopts a "reasonableness" standard as that term is used
in American law, not a standard that is deferential to the cap-
tain.3 2 The court concluded, "[r] easonableness is a well-estab-
lished and easily-understood standard, one that American courts
are accustomed to applying in a wide variety of situations involv-
ing the behavior of individuals."33 Although the panel majority
declined to follow the First Circuit, it acknowledged that the
First Circuit "adopted an 'arbitrary or capricious' standard for
judging the behavior of airline crews" under the analogous stat-
ute for domestic air travel. 4
Applying its interpretation of "reasonable grounds to believe,"
the Ninth Circuit held that summary judgment was inappropri-
ate.3 5 The panel majority hypothesized, "[a] jury could con-
clude that a reasonable captain should have tried to find out
something about what was going on in the cabin" after the flight
attendant reported she lost control and before making the deci-
sion to divert to Reno.36 The panel majority also reasoned that a
jury could conclude that the captain lacked reasonable grounds
because, accepting everything the flight attendant said, there
was no evidence plaintiffs violated any laws. 37 Finally, the panel
majority surmised that a jury could conclude that the captain's
refusal to allow respondents to reboard the flight after the po-
lice decided not to arrest them was unreasonable.38
29 Id. at 9.
3 See Eid, 621 F.3d at 867-68 (applying a reasonableness test as opposed to a
more deferential standard).
31 Id. at 872.
32 Id. at 868.
33 Id.
- Id. (quoting Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2008));
see also 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006).
35 Eid, 621 F.3d at 872.
36 Id. at 869-70 (emphasis added).
37 Id. at 871-72.
3- Id. at 872.
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Judge Otero dissented, arguing that the Tokyo Convention re-
quires courts to review a captain's conduct under a more defer-
ential arbitrary and capricious standard, rather than a
reasonableness standard. 9 As the dissenting judge observed,
the Convention does not define "reasonable grounds to believe"
and "reasonable measures."4 And, the meaning of these terms
is not "clear on their face."'" Judge Otero explained that, al-
though "the term 'reasonable' is familiar in American law, ...
the relevant text in the instant case comes from a multilateral
agreement among nations with significant differences in both
procedural and substantive law."'42 Given the context in which
these terms are used and the Convention's broad provision of
immunity, he concluded that Alaska Airlines and the United
States were correct that the captain should receive considerable
deference.43 The dissent reasoned that an "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard
meets the principal goal of promoting air safety as well as the
goal of protecting the rights of passengers to be free from unwar-
ranted discrimination. A negligence standard, on the other
hand, will result in hesitation by the pilot in circumstances where
he should have acted [and] second-guessing by courts.4 4
Alaska Airlines petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of cer-
tiorari on January 24, 2011. 4 ' The airline argued,
Article 10 of the Tokyo Convention ... affords immunity from
civil suits to the aircraft captain and the airline regarding actions
taken on international flights whenever the captain acts in com-
pliance with the Convention. 46 Articles 6 and 8 of the Conven-
tion authorize the captain to take reasonable measures when the
captain has "reasonable grounds to believe" that a passenger has
committed or is about to commit any act that may, or does, jeop-
ardize safety, good order, or discipline on his aircraft.47
The question presented in the petition is:




43 Id. at 879-80.
- Id. at 886.
45 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Eid, No. 10-962 (filed
Jan. 24, 2011), 2011 WL 291136.
46 Id. at *i.
47 Id.
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Whether the Tokyo Convention requires deference to be given
to the aircraft captain's decision, based on reports received from
the cabin crew, to take action in response to passenger conduct
that may jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or
property therein or good order and discipline on board.4"
No decision is expected on certiorari until late in the term.
II. MONTREAL CONVENTION
The Montreal Convention,4 9 which became effective Novem-
ber 4, 2003, "applies to all international carriage of persons, bag-
gage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward."50  The
Montreal Convention was adopted to unify and replace the sys-
tem of liability which derives from the much older Warsaw Con-
vention.51 "[Tihe Montreal Convention is unique in that it
'represents a significant shift away from"' the Warsaw Conven-
tion, which primarily favored airlines in order to support the
burgeoning industry, "'to one that continues to protect airlines
from crippling liability, but shows increased concern for the
rights of passengers and shippers.' ,52
A. PREEMPTION UNDER THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
Courts have recently begun considering the preemptive scope
of the Montreal Convention. In Garrisi v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
the Eastern District of Michigan considered whether the Mon-
treal Convention preempted state law tort claims arising out of
an incident on a March 24, 2007, flight from Detroit, Michigan,
to Amsterdam, Netherlands.5 3 The plaintiff, Ms. Garrisi, was a
passenger on the flight.5 4 "At the start of the flight, but before
the aircraft left the airport, a flight attendant knocked a cup of
hot coffee onto [Ms.] Garrisi's lap," causing injuries to Ms. Gar-
risi that required medical attention.55 "On March 24, 2010,
[Ms.] Garrisi filed a complaint in Wayne County Circuit Court,
4 Id.
49 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45 (entered into
force Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
50 Id. art. 1, para. 1.
51 Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 371 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004).
52 See Garrisi v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. 10-12298, 2010 WL 3702374, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 16, 2010) (quoting Weiss v. El Ai Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d
361, 364-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
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asserting a single state law claim of negligence. ' 56 "On June 10,
2010, Northwest [Airlines] timely removed the case to federal
court on the grounds of diversity jurisdiction and . . . federal
question jurisdiction based on complete preemption under the
Montreal Convention. ' 57 Northwest then filed a motion to dis-
miss based on the Montreal Convention's two year statute of
limitations.58
The court first considered Northwest's claim that federal di-
versity jurisdiction existed.59 The court found the parties di-
verse; Ms. Garrisi was a citizen of Michigan, and Northwest was a
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
Georgia.60 The court, however, found that the amount-in-con-
troversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction was not met be-
cause Ms. Garrisi's complaint sought damages only "in excess of
$25,000."61 Although Northwest asserted that Ms. Garrisi's dam-
ages, if believed by a jury, would be in excess of $75,000, the
court found that "the mere assertions" that her damages would
exceed the jurisdictional amount were insufficient to invoke di-
versity jurisdiction.62
Because the diversity jurisdiction claim failed, the court next
considered Northwest's claim that it had federal question juris-
diction because the Montreal Convention completely pre-
empted Ms. Garrisi's state law claims. First, the court noted
that Ms. Garrisi was on a flight between two of the Montreal
Convention's signatory countries-the United States and the
Netherlands-and, thus, Northwest was engaged in "interna-
tional carriage" within the meaning of the Convention.64
Next, the court examined Article 29 of the Convention, which
states, "'[i] n the carriage of passengers.., any action for dam-
ages, however founded, whether under this Convention or in
contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to
the . . . limits of liability as are set out in this Convention.' 65
The court then undertook a survey of relevant case law, finding




59 Id. at *2.
6o Id.
61 Id. at *2-3.
62 Id.
63 Id. at *3.
64 Id. at *3-4.
65 Id. at *4 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 49, art. 29).
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lines, Ltd. v. Tseng,6 6 which held that "the Warsaw Convention
precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal
injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy
the conditions for liability under the [Warsaw] Convention. '"67
In light of Tseng, the court held that the Montreal Convention
preempts all state law causes of action for matters within the
Convention's scope. 68 The court reasoned that this promotes
the "'federal policy of uniformity and certainty' embodied by
the treaty."69 Thus, the court found that removal was proper
based on the presence of federal question jurisdiction."v The
court went on to grant Northwest's motion to dismiss, finding
that Ms. Garrisi's claim was time barred by the Montreal's Con-
vention's two year statute of limitations.71
Not all courts, however, have found that the Montreal Con-
vention completely preempts state law. In Cosgrove-Goodman v.
UAL Corp., the court took a different view of Article 29 of the
Montreal Convention.7 2 The plaintiff in Cosgrove-Goodman sued
UAL Corporation (UAL) in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, for injuries sustained after she slipped on a greasy sub-
stance on the jet way floor v.7  "UAL removed the case to federal
court alleging federal question jurisdiction" on the basis of the
Montreal Convention. 4 The plaintiff then moved to remand
the action back to the Circuit Court of Cook County.
75
In deciding whether the Montreal Convention preempted the
plaintiffs state law claims, the Cosgrove-Goodman court, like the
Garrisi court, sought guidance from cases interpreting both the
Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention.76 Specifi-
cally, the court found persuasive the analysis in Narkiewicz-Laine
v. Scandinavian Airlines Systems.77 In Narkiewicz-Laine, the North-
ern District of Illinois analogized Article 29 of the Montreal
66 Id. at *4-5.
67 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999).
6 Garrisi, 2010 WL 3702374, at *5.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at *6.
72 See Cosgrove-Goodman v. UAL Corp., No. I0-CV-1908, 2010 WL 2197674, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2010).
73 Id. at *1.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at *3.
77 Id. See generally Narkiewicz-Laine v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 587 F. Supp.
2d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
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Convention to the very similar Article 24 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion.78 The court noted that the Seventh Circuit recently con-
sidered the language of Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention
and found that "'Article 24 expressly contemplates that an ac-
tion may be brought in contract or in tort. The liability limita-
tion provisions of the Warsaw Convention simply operate as an
affirmative defense.'- 79 Based on this reasoning, the Narkiewicz-
Laine court ultimately held that the conditions and limits of the
Montreal Convention are defenses to state law breach of con-
tract claims, and "they do not provide a basis for federal-ques-
tion subject matter jurisdiction."s
The Cosgrove-Goodman court found this reasoning persuasive. 8
It also found support for denying federal question jurisdiction
in the plain language of Article 29.82 The court noted that Arti-
cle 29 "specifically contemplates" that actions for damages may
be "'founded... under this Convention or in contract or in tort
or otherwise."' 83 The court reasoned that if it held the Mon-
treal Convention to completely preempt state law, it "'would
render meaningless the words "or in contract or in tort or other-
wise."" 84 The Cosgrove-Goodman court therefore found it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims because the
face of the complaint only invoked state law.8 5 Remanding the
case to the Circuit Court of Cook County, the court noted that
78 Narkiewicz-Laine, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 890. Compare Montreal Convention,
supra note 50, art. 29 ( "In the carriage of ... cargo, any action for damages,
however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or
otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liabil-
ity as are set out in this Convention .... "), with Additional Protocol No. 4 to
Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Interna-
tional Carriage by Air, art. 24, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as Amended
by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, opened for signature
Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in Sec. Rep. No. 105-20 ("in the carriage of cargo, any
action for damages, however founded, whether under this convention or in con-
tract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and
limits of liability set out in this convention . . ").
79 Narkiewicz-Laine, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 890 (quoting Sompo Japan Ins., Inc. v.
Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir. 2008)).
80 Id.
81 Cosgrove-Goodman, 2010 WL 2197674, at *3.
82 Id.
83 Id.; see also Montreal Convention, supra note 49, art. 29.
84 Cosgrove-Goodman, 2010 WL 2197674, at *3 (quoting Nankin v. Cont'l Air-
lines, Inc., No. CV 09-07851 MMM (RZx), 2010 WL 342632 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29,
2010)).
85 Id. at *4.
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the liability limits in the Montreal Convention would act as an
affirmative defense to the plaintiffs claims for damages.8 6
In Atia v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the Eastern District of Kentucky
considered whether the Montreal Convention preempts a plain-
tiffs claim for breach of contract against Delta Airlines
(Delta).87 The case arose out of Delta's refusal to transport the
plaintiff from Los Angeles, California, to Tel Aviv, Israel."8 The
court began with the premise that the Montreal Convention
"preempts all.., state-law claims falling within its scope."8" The
issue, in the court's view, was whether nonperformance of a con-
tract falls within the Convention's provisions.9 0 Delta contended
that the Montreal Convention preempted the plaintiffs breach
of contract claim because it arose out of events that occurred
during the embarkation of an international flight.9 ' The plain-
tiff, on the other hand, responded "that her claim [fell] outside
the scope of the Convention because she allege[d] non-per-
formance of a contract. '9 2
In making its determination, the Atia court found most per-
suasive the reasoning in Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines,9" a Seventh
Circuit decision interpreting the Warsaw Convention.94 In
Wolgel, the Seventh Circuit held "that there was no need for a
remedy in the [Warsaw] Convention for total nonperformance
of [a] contract, because in such a case the injured party has a
remedy under the law of his or her home country. ' 95 Thus, the
Seventh Circuit held that the Warsaw Convention did "not apply
to a case of nonperformance of a contract."'96
The Atia court buttressed its reliance on the Wolgel decision
with the plain language of the Montreal Convention.97 Article
19 of the Convention, which Delta alleged governed the plain-
tiffs case, states only that "'[t]he carrier is liable for damage
occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers.' "98 Be-
86 Id. at *3-4.
87 See generally Atia v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Ky. 2010).
88 Id. at 695-96.




93 Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1987).
94 Atia, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
95 Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 444.
96 Id.
97 Atia, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
98 Id.; see also Montreal Convention, supra note 49, art. 19.
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cause the plaintiffs claims were for complete nonperformance,
not mere delay, the court found them outside the Convention's
scope.99
A case that focuses on the differences between the Warsaw
Convention and the Montreal Convention, rather than on their
similarities, is Eli Lilly & Co. v. Air Express International USA,
Inc.' In Eli Lilly, the court considered whether the liability lim-
its in the Warsaw Convention preempted Eli Lilly's claims for
breach of a long-term service agreement and two air waybill
contracts.101
The case arose "out of the spoliation of temperature-sensitive
insulin products, which" defendant Air Express International
USA, Inc. (DHL) shipped from France to the United States and
"were exposed to sub-freezing temperatures en route. ' 10 2 "Seek-
ing to recover for damage to the insulin products," Eli Lilly sued
DHL for breach of its long-term service agreement and two air
waybill contracts for the carriage of the damaged products.103
"The district court dismissed the claim for breach of the service
agreement" as preempted by the Montreal Convention, but
granted Eli Lilly "summary judgment on the issue of liability for
breach" under the service agreement, holding that the Montreal
Convention did not govern DHL's liability but rather the service
agreement's liability provision governed.104 DHL appealed, con-
tending that the limitations of the Montreal Convention should
apply regardless of the liability provision in the service
contract. 105
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with DHL. 10 6 It noted that Arti-
cle 22(3) of the Montreal Convention limits potential liability
for damage to cargo, and these limits can be increased in only
two ways.10 7 First, under Article 22(3), the consignor may make
- Atia, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 701. The court also considered claims of discrimina-
tion made by the plaintiff against a Delta employee. Id. at 698. These claims, the
court found, were preempted by the Montreal Convention because the events
leading up to the claim "took place during embarkation of an international
flight." Id. at 703.
100 See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Air Express Int'l USA, Inc., 615 F.3d 1305
(11th Cir. 2010).





106 Id. at 1318.
107 Id. at 1308; see also Montreal Convention, supra note 49, arts. 22, 25.
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"'a special declaration of interest"' at the time the package is
handed over to the carrier. 108 This provision mirrors Article 22
of the Warsaw Convention and, thus, "did not represent a
change in the law."' 0 9 Second, Article 25 of the Montreal Con-
vention allows a consignor to "'stipulate that the contract of car-
riage shall be subject to higher limits of liability than those
provided for in this Convention. "'11 0 As the court noted, "Arti-
cle 25 is new; there is no parallel provision in the Warsaw Con-
vention or its subsequent amendments."'' Thus, the issue
before the court was whether the liability provision of the long-
term service agreement was a stipulation within the meaning of
Article 25.112
The court noted that it must first "discern whether the parties
intended to incorporate" the long-term service agreement liabil-
ity provision into the contracts of carriage (the air waybills).'1
Concluding that the parties did not so intend, the court noted
that " [t] he service agreement took effectJanuary 1, 2003, eleven
months before the Montreal Convention entered into force."
'
"1 4
At the time, the governing law was the Warsaw Convention,
which contained no provision parallel to Article 25 allowing "a
carrier [to] stipulate that a contract of carriage would be subject
to increased limits on liability.""' 5 The court found that, under
the Warsaw Convention, such a stipulation "may have been inva-
lid.""' 6 This suggested "that the parties did not intend such a
result.""' 7 Moreover, the court noted that the service agreement
made no mention of either the Warsaw Convention or the Mon-
treal Convention."' Therefore, the court held there was "no
indication that the parties intended to opt out of the Montreal
Convention liability regime. '""'  The court nevertheless left
open the question of whether a stipulation in a service agree-
108 Eli Lilly & Co., 615 F.3d at 1308 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note
49, art. 22).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1308-09 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 49, art. 25).
111 Id. at 1309.
112 Id. at 1314.
113 Id.





119 Id. at 1316.
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ment could constitute an effective stipulation under Article 25 if
the parties had so intended.
B. THE MEANING OF "EMBARKING" AND "DISEMBARKING" UNDER
THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
Under the Montreal Convention, a carrier is liable for a pas-
senger's "death or bodily injury" only where "the accident which
caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in
the course of the operations of embarking or disembarking"
from international carriage.12 ° In Fedelich v. American Airlines,
the court examined the scope of what constitutes "disembark-
ing" an international flight.' 2' There, the plaintiff injured her-
self when she fell "at an international baggage carousel in the
San Juan International Airport" in Puerto Rico on her way home
from the Dominican Republic. 122 Defendant American Airlines
argued that the Montreal Convention governed the accident be-
cause the plaintiff was in the process of disembarking.123 The
plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that Puerto Rico's tort
law governed the case and "she [was] entitled to recover due to
[American Airlines'] negligence in maintaining its premises. 124
The court stated that the inquiry into whether the plaintiff
was "disembarking" within the meaning of the Convention
should focus on three factors: "(1) the passenger's activity at the
time of the injury, (2) where the passenger was located, and (3)
the extent to which the carrier was exercising control over the
passenger at the moment of injury."1 25 The court should ad-
dress these three factors not as separate inquiries but in uni-
son.126 The court noted that the act of disembarking should
normally be construed narrowly, "strongly relating the accident
with the physical act of [leaving] the plane.' 2 v
In considering the three factors, the court noted first that the
"[p]laintiff was injured [while] retrieving her luggage from the
international baggage carousel, a location far removed from
120 Montreal Convention, supra note 49, art. 17, para. 1.
12, Fedelich v. Am. Airlines, 724 F. Supp. 2d 274, 284 (D.P.R. 2010).
122 Id. at 276.
123 Id. at 276-77.
124 Id. at 283.
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[the area] where passengers descend from the aircraft."12' The
court also pointed out that "although connected to her flight,
baggage retrieval was not an action necessary to become sepa-
rated from the plane. '129 The court noted that the "[p]laintiff
was free to roam around, and choose her path, unlike when the
airline directs passengers to line up and enter the plane."13
The court concluded that, at the time of the fall, the "[p] laintiff
was free from AA's direction, removed from the arrival gate, and
in the baggage claim area, a space where courts have held pas-
sengers are no longer in the process of disembarking."'' Thus,
the court found that the Montreal Convention did not govern
the plaintiffs claim, but rather Puerto Rican tort law
governed. 132
On the other hand, in Matveychuk v. Deutsche Lufthansa, AG,
the Eastern District of New York took an expansive view of what
constitutes "embarking" on an international flight.133  In
Matveychuk, the plaintiff was denied access in Frankfurt, Ger-
many, to the final leg of her international travel between New-
ark, New Jersey, and Minsk, Belarus.'3 4 The airline denied
plaintiff boarding on her flight to Minsk because, due to a delay
in her flight from NewJersey to Germany, she arrived at the gate
approximately 20 minutes late.' 35 Despite the fact that the
plane was still at the terminal, the gate agent informed the
plaintiff she would not be permitted to board. 13 6 The agent
then instructed the plaintiff to go to the rebooking desk to ar-
range another flight. 3 7 On her way to the rebooking desk, the
plaintiff stopped in the restroom and injured herself) 3 The






133 See generally Matveychuk v. Deutsche Lufthansa, AG, No. 08-CV-3108
(JG) (RML), 2010 WL 3540921 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010).




138 Id. The parties disagree as to how the plaintiff was injured. Id. She claims
that "the gate agent followed her into the restroom and pushed her," causing her
to fall and lose consciousness. Id. The defendant denies that the gate agent ar-
gued with or pushed the plaintiff. Id.
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the restroom occurred during the process of "embarking" on an
international flight. 13 9
To determine if the plaintiff was "embarking," the Matveychuk
court considered factors similar to those considered by the court
in Fedelich: "(1) the activity of the passenger at the time of the
accident; (2) the restrictions, if any, on her movements; (3) the
imminence of actual boarding; and (4) the physical proximity of
the passenger to the gate."14 The court noted that, in applying
these factors, courts generally should pay close attention to
whether the injuries were "sustained close in time to the board-
ing process and in areas that are near departure gates and lim-
ited to ticketed passengers.
141
Here, Deutsche Lufthansa contended that, because the plain-
tiff s plane had stopped boarding before she arrived at the gate,
this compelled the conclusion "that she could not have been
injured while . . . 'embarking.' "142 The court disagreed, noting
it "should not maintain a myopic focus on the discrete act of
enplaning when determining whether an injury is encompassed
by [the Convention]."143 The court stated, "[d] elays and missed
connecting flights are usual and predictable occurrences of air
travel," and given this reality, the plaintiff was in the act of "em-
barking. '144 Finally, the court reasoned, "it would not serve the
[Convention's] goal of predictable liability to deny claim cover-
age to a passenger solely because her alleged injury occurred
shortly after her connecting flight departed.' 1 45 Thus, the court
granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding that
the Montreal Convention governed her claims.1 46
C. THE MEANING OF "ACCIDENT" UNDER THE
MONTREAL CONVENTION
In Ginsberg v. American Airlines, the court considered the
meaning of the term "accident" under Article 17 of the Mon-
treal Convention. 47 The plaintiff in Ginsbergwas involved in an
139 Id. at *2.
140 Id. (citing King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 359 (2d Cir. 2002)).
141 Id.




146 Id. at *4.
147 Ginsberg v. Am. Airlines, No. 09 Civ. 3226(LTS) (KNF), 2010 WL 3958843,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010). For the content of Article 17, see supra text ac-
companying note 121.
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altercation with a flight attendant after using the aircraft rest-
room during a flight from New York to Turks and Caicos. 4 '
When the plaintiff attempted to return to his seat, the flight at-
tendant told him to wait for her to move the food and beverage
cart in the aisle. 14 9 When the flight attendant left the cart unat-
tended, the plaintiff began moving the cart himself.1 50 They
then had a confrontation.1 5' The plaintiff claimed "that the
flight attendant pushed and shoved him at the commencement
of the altercation," whereas the flight attendant stated "that she
put her left arm around [the plaintiff], on top of the cart, and
her left foot at the bottom of the cart. 1 52 After the flight arrived
in Turks and Caicos, local police questioned the plaintiff. 53
American Airlines later refused to honor his return ticket.'
54
In the lawsuit that followed, American Airlines moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the Montreal Convention pre-
empted the plaintiffs claims.1 55 The court granted the airline's
motion with respect to the assault and battery claims. 56
First, the court held that, like the Warsaw Convention, the
Montreal Convention completely preempts all claims within its
reach. 15  Therefore, the court examined whether the incident
between Ginsberg and the flight attendant was an "accident"
within the meaning of the convention.1 58 The court next ex-
plained that "the term 'accident,' as used in the analogous pro-
vision of the Warsaw Convention, means 'an unexpected or
unusual event or happening that is external to the passen-
ger.'"'5" Applying this definition, the court held that "no 'acci-
dent' had occurred." 6 ' The altercation was not "unexpected,"
as the plaintiff had "willfully disregarded [the flight attendant's]
instructions and moved the cart with the knowledge that an al-
tercation could occur."' 61 Nor was the altercation "external" to







155 Id. at *3.
156 Id. at *6.
157 Id. at *3.
158 Id. at *4.
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the plaintiff, as it was the result of his "own decision to move the
cart," which he knew could cause a confrontation.1 62
The court also held that Ginsberg did not suffer "bodily in-
jury" within the meaning of the convention because he "stipu-
lated that he did not suffer from any physical or bodily injury,
nor did he suffer any resulting psychological injury." 6 ' Thus,
the Montreal Convention barred all claims arising from the
onboard incident.1 6 4
III. PUBLIC USE AIRCRAFT
Mercy Flight Central, Inc. v. New York Division of State Police ad-
dressed whether the New York State Police and the Onondoga
County Sheriffs Department violated federal law by providing
helicopter emergency medical services without being properly
certified by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).65 The
plaintiffs were competing private providers of commercial emer-
gency medical air transportation services.'66 They alleged that
the State Police and Sheriffs Department violated the Federal
Aviation Act by not meeting FAA certification requirements that
the FAA required civilian aircraft operators, like the plaintiffs, to
meet.16
7
In a motion to dismiss, the State Police argued it was operat-
ing "public aircraft," and thus not required to obtain the same
FAA certification as "civilian aircraft operators.""16 The parties
did not dispute that "'civilian aircraft operations' are required
to be certified within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 41101 (a), and
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. The plaintiff in Ginsberg also asserted claims for false arrest based on
questioning and detention by the Turks and Caicos police, conspiracy by Ameri-
can Airlines, and intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of con-
tract based on the airline's refusal to honor his return ticket. Id. at *4-5. The
court granted American's motion for summaryjudgment as to all but the breach
of contract claim. Id. at *6. Notably, the court held that Article 19 of the Mon-
treal Convention, which "covers damage claims for 'delay,'" did not apply to the
breach of contract claim because American had cancelled the plaintiff's ticket,
and thus he could not have been in the course of "embarking" when the injury
occurred. Id. at *5.
165 Memorandum-Decision and Order at 2, Mercy Flight Central, Inc. v. N.Y.
Div. of State Police, No. 5:08-CV-1041-FJS-GHL (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2010), ECF 49.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 3.
-6 Id. at 9-10.
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that 'public aircraft' are not required to obtain the same
certification." 169
The district court explained that for aircraft to be classified as
"public aircraft," the defendants must show that those aircraft
"(1) are owned and operated by a government; (2) carry only
'crewmembers' and 'qualified non-crewmembers;' and (3) are
not used for 'commercial purposes."' 170 The court found that
"medi-vac services are a 'government function' and that both pa-
tients and medical personnel are 'qualified non-crewmembers'
because their presence is required to perform, and is associated
with, a 'government function. ' 171  The court also found that
medi-vac services "are in no way 'a major enterprise for profit,"'
and thus are not used for a "commercial purpose.' ' 72 Conclud-
ing that the aircraft were "public aircraft" not subject to FAA
regulation, the court granted the State Police's motion to
dismiss.17
3
In Houlihan v. Capital Airways, LLC, defendant Capital Airways
laid off plaintiff Michael Houlihan from his position as Director
of Maintenance.1 74 Houlihan claimed this breached his employ-
ment agreement with Capital Airways. 17 Capital Airways filed a
motion for summary judgment, claiming it terminated Houli-
han within the terms of his employment agreement because he
"falsified maintenance records by backdating corrective actions
on aircraft logs on at least three occasions," in violation of appli-
cable FAA regulations. 176 Houlihan submitted an affidavit with
his reply to Capital Airways' motion for summary judgment, stat-
ing that "'the 737 was being operated as a public use aircraft so
technically, the Code of Federal Aviation Regulations did not
apply,"' and thus he did not violate his employment
agreement. 177
Capital Airways then filed a motion to strike the portions of
Houlihan's affidavit referring to the aircraft on which he worked
169 Id. (internal citation omitted).
170 Id. at 12 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(41)(C), 40125(b) (2006)).
171 Id. at 13.
172 Id. at 16.
173 Id. The court also noted that it had already dismissed the plaintiffs' claims
against the Sheriffs Department, but that this was another reason why the plain-
tiffs' claims against the Sheriffs Department must fail. Id. at 16 n.10.
174 Houlihan v. Capital Airways, LLC, No. H-09-CV-0883, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34612, at *3-4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2010).
175 Id. at *4.
176 Id. at *5.
177 Id. at *8-9.
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as "public use aircraft."17 Capital Airways argued that this
called for an expert opinion, which Houlihan was not qualified
to provide.'79
The court ordered that the references to "public use aircraft"
be stricken from Houlihan's affidavit, as these were only based
on Houlihan's unsupported opinion."' The court reasoned
that "'evidence inadmissible at trial cannot be used to avoid
summary judgment,"' and that "'conclusory assertions cannot
be used in an affidavit on summary judgment.""" This conclu-
sion suggests that, to establish an aircraft is a "public aircraft," a
party must offer either expert testimony or a lay witness affidavit
containing factual detail beyond mere conclusory statements.
The ongoing In re Helicopter Crash Near Weaverville, California
8/5/08 multi-district litigation arises from the crash of a Sikorsky
S-61N helicopter in the Shasta Trinity National Forest, Califor-
nia, on August 5, 2008.182 Carson Helicopters, Inc. owned the
helicopter in this case and it operated as a public use flight ac-
cording to a contract with the U.S. Forest Service to transport
firefighters engaged in battling forest fires.18 ' The helicopter
impacted trees and terrain during the initial climb after takeoff
from a helispot in mountainous terrain. 4 "Impact forces and a
post-crash fire destroyed the helicopter. 181 5 The pilot-in-com-
mand, a U.S. Forest Service check pilot, a crewmember, and
seven firefighters were killed in the crash; the co-pilot and three
other firefighters were injured.'86
178 Id.
179 Id. at *8.
180 Id. at *9-10. The court denied Capital Airways' motion for summaryjudg-
ment, however, as it found that the parties had raised genuine issues of material
fact regarding the terms of the employment agreement. Id. at *11.
181 Id. at *8-9 (internal citations omitted).
182 In re Helicopter Crash Near Weaverville, Cal. 8/5/08, 714 F. Supp. 2d 1098,
1100 (D. Or. 2010).
183 Id.
184 NAT'L TRANsp. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT: CRASH DURING TAKE-
OFF OF CARSON HELICOPTERS INC., FIREFIGHTING HELICOPTER UNDER CONTRACT TO
THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE, SIKORSKY S-61N, N612AZ, NEAR WEAVERVILLE, CALIFOR-
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The NTSB held a final public hearing regarding its investiga-
tion into the causes of the accident on December 7, 2010.187
The NTSB found that one of the probable causes of the acci-
dent was "insufficient oversight by the U.S. [Forest Service] and
the Federal Aviation Administration" of public use aircraft such
as the helicopter involved in this accident." ' In herclosing
statement at the NTSB public hearing, NTSB Chairman
Deborah A.P. Hersman noted, "[o]ver the years public aircraft
have been-made the orphans of the aviation industry. It's now
time for the FAA and other government agencies to step up and
take responsibility."1 89
Shortly after the NTSB's final public hearing, the NTSB re-
leased its final Aircraft Accident Report. In this report, the
NTSB explained that the FAA claims it has no statutory author-
ity to regulate public aircraft operations.'9" The FAA's rationale
begins with the fact that its primary authority to regulate avia-
tion is found in 49 U.S.C. § 44701, which instructs the FAA Ad-
ministrator to "promote the safe flight of civil aircraft in air
commerce" through minimum standards in the interest of
safety."' 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (41) (A) defines a "public air-
craft" to include "an aircraft used only for the United States gov-
ernment, except as provided in section 40125(b)."' 92 49 U.S.C.
§ 40125(b) states that an aircraft does not qualify as a public
aircraft "when the aircraft is used for commercial purposes or to
carry an individual other than a crewmember or a qualified non-
crewmember.11 93 The FAA requires aircraft in this "public air-
craft" category to comply only with "spot inspections of the air-
craft and aircraft records." '94 The maintenance records of a
public aircraft operator are therefore eligible for review, but the
187 Public Meeting of December 7, 2010, Executive Summary, NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY
BD., http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2010/AAR1006.htm (last visited May 16,
2011).
188 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 185, at 14.
189 Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Closing State-
ment at the Sunshine Meeting (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/
events/2010/WeavervilleCA/closing-statement.htm.
190 AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 184, at 82.
19, Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 44701 (2006)).
192 § 40102(a) (41) (A).
193 § 40125(b).
194 General Technical Administration, 3, § 3-565, (2011), available at http://
fsims.faa.gov/picresults.aspx?mode=EBookContents (click "volume 3 General
Technical Administration" hyperlink).
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operator is not subject to FAA regulations regarding the opera-
tion of the aircraft.
As a result of this investigation, the NTSB recommended that
the FAA "take appropriate actions to clarify FAA authority over
public aircraft, as well as identify and document where such
oversight responsibilities reside in the absence of FAA author-
ity."' 95 The NTSB also recommended that the FAA "develop
and implement a surveillance program specifically for Part 135
operators with aircraft that can operate both as public aircraft
and as civil aircraft-to maintain continual oversight ensuring
compliance with [14 CFR] Part 135 requirements." 196
The FAA is currently taking action in direct response to the
NTSB's investigation of the Shasta Trinity accident.'9 7 John Al-
len, Director of Flight Standards Service for the FAA, spoke on
January 20, 2011, at a Public Aircraft Operations Forum spon-
sored by Helicopter Association International.' 9 Mr. Allen's
presentation indicated that
"[t]he FAA will consider ALL [government-] contracted aircraft
operations as civil aircraft operations, until: [(1)] [t]he con-
tracting government entity provides the operator with a written
declaration of public aircraft status for applicable flights; [(2)]
the contracting government entity notifies the local FAA Flight
Standards District Office; ... [and (3)] [t]he flights in question
are determined to be legitimate public aircraft operations.' 99
This declaration must be done "in advance of the proposed pub-
lic aircraft flight. '20 0 If such a declaration has not been made,
"all operations must be conducted in accordance with all appli-
cable [FAA] regulations. "201 Further, if an operator is offered a
contract to perform operations in violation of FAA regulations,
it is the operator's responsibility to refuse to accept the contract
or notify the FAA.2 °2 Mr. Allen also noted that even "[w] hen a
declaration of public aircraft operation status has been made,
195 AIRCRAF-r AccIDENT REPORT, supra note 184, at 120.
196 Id. at 106.
197 See HAI Public Aircraft Meeting -January 20, 2011, HELICOPrER Ass'N INT'L,
http://www.rotor.com/Operations/PublicAircraftMeeting.aspx (last visited May
17, 2011).
198 Id.
9 John Allen, Dir., Flight Standards Serv., Public Aircraft Operations Forum
7-8 (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://www.rotor.com/Operations/PublicAir-
craftMeeting.aspx (download "FAA Public Aircraft Presentation.ppt" hyperlink).
200 Id. at 8.
201 Id. at 11.
202 Id.
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the operator must still comply with certain [FAA] regula-
tions. '2 °3 Further, if a public aircraft is operated outside of an
approved "14 CFR Maintenance Program, Type Certificate Data
sheet, or is modified in a manner not consistent with the regula-
tions, it must undergo a conformity inspection prior to re-
turning to civil aircraft status."2 4 Finally, Mr. Allen explained
that the FAA is revising its Public Aircraft Advisory Circular to
clarify these issues. 20 5
IV. COMAIR FLIGHT 5191
In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006206 arises
out of the crash of Comair Flight 5191 shortly after takeoff near
Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, Kentucky.207 According to
NTSB reports, the pilots lined the aircraft up on a runway that
was too short to execute a takeoff of a commercial jet of this
kind.2 8 The plane crashed into a nearby field and ignited, leav-
ing 49 people dead.20 9 The only survivor was the co-pilot, First
Officer James Polehinke.2 1°
In re Air Crash at Lexington, Kentucky originally involved claims
brought by the survivors of all 47 passenger decedents against
various Comair corporate entities. 21I All but one claim against
Comair settled in 2008.212 The last remaining matter from the
crash of Comair Flight 5191 was the case on behalf of passenger
Brian Woodward's daughters, Lauren Herbert and Mattie-Kay
Herbert, and Mr. Woodward's estate. 213 In 2009, on the plain-
tiffs' motion, the court ruled "as a matter of law that the conduct
of the pilots caused the plane crash. '214 In December 2009, af-
ter trial on the issue of compensatory damages, a jury awarded
203 Id. at 12.
204 Id. at 16.
205 Id. at 17.
206 In reAir Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2011
WL 350469 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2011).
207 Brett Barrouquere, Judge: No Punitive Damages Against Comair in Crash Case,





211 Id.; In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., 2011 WL 350469, at *1. Legal matters
are still pending between the remaining two decedents (the pilot and a Comair
crew member) and Comair. Barrouquere, supra note 207.
212 Barrouquere, supra note 207.
213 In re Air Crash at Lxington, Ky., 2011 WL 350469, at *1.
214 Id.
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the Herbert sisters $7.1 million in compensatory damages from
Comair. ' The Herbert sisters continued to seek punitive dam-
ages from the airline under Kentucky's punitive damages stat-
ute, Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 411.184, alleging that
Comair was grossly negligent.2 1 6
The following noteworthy orders have shaped the course of
this litigation over the past year.
A. MOTIONS IN LIMINE
Comair moved in limine to exclude evidence regarding the
hiring and retention of First Officer Polehinke "on the ground
that such evidence, at best, shows nothing more than negligent
hiring or retention and is not relevant to a claim of gross negli-
gence. ' 217 The plaintiffs countered that their intention was not
to show negligent hiring, but rather to show an "'unsafe culture
and grossly negligent supervision that permeated Comair. '218
The plaintiffs further argued that, in light of Comair's person-
nel reports, which insisted that Polehinke flew "'by-the-book,"'
they must be able to expose "his repeated training deficiencies
and failed check rides. ' 219  The insufficient supervision of
Polehinke, according to the plaintiffs, made "'it more probable
that gross negligence by Comair's management in its supervi-
sion of pilots and allowing an unsafe lax culture was a substan-
tial factor in causing the crash of flight 5191.' "220
Denying Comair's motion, the court reasoned that once the
plaintiffs opened this "'culture-of-safety"' door, Comair would
be able to defend against that claim by providing evidence that
Polehinke and the rest of the crew were well-trained, good pilots
with plenty of experience.2 2'
The court also denied Comair's motion in limine to exclude
any "references to the 'killing' of passengers" during trial "[s]o
long as restraint is exercised. ' 2 2 The court referenced its April
215 Id.
216 Id. at *1-2.
217 Order at 1, In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-




221 Id. at 2.
222 Order at 1, In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-
316-KSF (E.D. Ky. July 12, 2010), ECF 3810 [hereinafter Motion in Limine].
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2010 order denying Comair's motion for a new trial,223 in which
the court found no "'gross injustice"' done by the plaintiffs'
counsel's comment during closing argument that Woodward
was "killed" and that it was Comair's "fault. '224 The court noted
that Comair's own counsel used the term "killed" in his opening
statement, and "[p] laintiffs did not suggest the pilots intention-
ally crashed the plane. ' 225 Finally, because the "first listed defi-
nition of 'kill' in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary is 'to
deprive of life: cause the death of,' "226 the court reasoned that
there was no need to exclude the word entirely, provided that
the plaintiffs use caution in their word choice.22 v
B. MOTION FOR A SIMULTANEOUS TRIAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST
COMAIR AND THE UNITED STATES
During pretrial proceedings, the plaintiffs moved for a simul-
taneous trial of their gross negligence/punitive damages claims
against Comair and their negligence claims against the United
States.228 The plaintiffs argued that although the United States
and Comair reached an agreement regarding how liability
would be allocated between the two defendants, the plaintiffs
were not parties to that agreement.229 In response, Comair ar-
gued that, because the total amount of the plaintiffs' compensa-
tory damages had been decided in the 2009 trial, there was no
longer any justiciable controversy between the plaintiffs and the
United States.23 0  The United States also responded that
"avoid [ing] the cost and inconvenience of trial" was exactly the
reason the settlement arrangement had been made with
Comair 3 1
The court denied the motion for a simultaneous trial, agree-
ing that the settlement between Comair and the United States
"renders the issue moot. ' 23 2 In reaching its decision, the court
also considered that the "United States cannot be liable for pu-
223 Id.
224 Op. and Order at 10-12, In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006,
No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF (E.D. Ky. Apr. 2, 2010), ECF 3750.
225 Id. at 11.
226 Id. at 11-12.
227 Motion in Limine, supra note 222.
228 Op. and Order at 1, In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No.
5:06-CV-316-KSF (E.D. Ky. July 12, 2010), ECF 3812.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 2.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 5, 7.
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nitive damages" and the plaintiffs already had a 'judgment
against Comair for the entire amount of their compensatory
damages." 233
C. MOTION TO RECONSIDER AVAILABILITY OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES UNDER KENTUCKY LAW
In late 2010, Comair asked the court to reconsider its previous
decisions finding the punitive damages statute, KRS 411.184, un-
constitutional as applied to wrongful death actions. 2 4 The
court ruled in 2008, and reaffirmed in 2009, that the statute
"did not apply to a wrongful death case because Kentucky Con-
stitution Section 241 prohibited limitations on damages in
wrongful death cases. The court ruled earlier that KRS
411.184(2) and (3) would unconstitutionally limit the recovery
of punitive damages. ' 235 At the time of these earlier rulings, the
court was unable to locate a case in which a party raised the
issue of the constitutionality of KRS 411.184(2) and (3) as ap-
plied to wrongful death cases.23 6 Thus, in 2008, the court at-
tempted to anticipate how Kentucky courts would decide the
question of whether Section 241 prohibited application of the
punitive damages statute to wrongful death cases.
237
In early 2011, upon reconsideration of its 2008 decision, the
court found that recent court decisions applying KRS 411.184 to
wrongful death actions did not find these sections of the puni-
tive damages statute unconstitutional under the Kentucky Con-
stitution.238 The court concluded that its earlier decision did
not interpret Kentucky law correctly and accordingly held that
"Kentucky courts would apply the punitive damages statute...
to wrongful death cases, including the present case. "239
Under the now-applicable Kentucky punitive damages stat-
ute,240 a plaintiff must "(1) establish gross negligence by clear
and convincing evidence; and (2) prove the employer 'author-
ized or ratified or should have anticipated the conduct in ques-
233 Id. at 5.
234 In reAir Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2011
WL 350469, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2011).
235 Id. at *2. For the original order holding that the punitive damages statute
did not apply to wrongful death cases, see In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug.
27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF, 2008 WL 2369785 (E.D. Ky. June 6, 2008).
236 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., 2011 WL 350469, at *2.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Id. at *5.
240 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.184 (West 2010).
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tion' in order to impose punitive damages on an employer for
the gross negligence of its employees. ' 241 The court found that
the "overwhelming evidence is that the Flight 5191 pilots vio-
lated Comair training, the procedures in Comair's manuals,
sterile cockpit rules, and the required taxi briefing" before take-
off. 24 2 The record, however, contained no evidence showing
that "Comair should have anticipated the reprehensible con-
duct" of the flight crew.243 Further, there was no evidence that
either pilot "had previously committed a similar error" such that
Comair would reasonably expect the conduct to reoccur.244
Because the plaintiffs did not show "by clear and convincing
evidence that there were similar incidents from which Comair
should have anticipated the pilots' conduct that caused the
crash of Flight 5191," and because there was "no evidence that
Comair authorized or ratified the conduct of the pilots," the
court found that the plaintiffs did not show gross negligence as
required by the punitive damages statute.245 Thus, the plaintiffs
were not entitled to punitive damages. 246 The court, therefore,
granted partial summary judgment to Comair on the issue of
punitive damages.247
V. CONTINENTAL FLIGHT 1404
In re Continental Airlines, Inc. arises out of the December 20,
2008 crash of Continental Flight 1404, which veered off the run-
way during takeoff and crashed into a ravine at Denver Interna-
tional Airport.248 The accident caused "no fatalities, but 37
passengers and crew were transported to the hospital" for treat-
ment of various injuries. 249 Representatives of the passengers
filed several lawsuits, consolidated in the District Court of Harris
County, Texas. 250
241 In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., 2011 WL 350469, at *5.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at *6.
245 Id. at *8.
246 Id.
247 Id. at *10.
248 In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 305 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2010, pet. granted).
249 Id.
250 Id. at 250 n.1.
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In October 2009, the plaintiffs noticed an apex deposition 251
of Larry Kellner, Continental's chief executive officer and chair-
man of the board of directors. 25 2 "Continental filed a motion to
quash the deposition, arguing that Kellner ha[d] no unique or
superior knowledge of discoverable information and [that] the
plaintiffs ha[d] not attempted to obtain discovery through less
intrusive methods. ' 255 The plaintiffs then
moved to compel Kellner's deposition, arguing that he ha[d]
unique or superior knowledge as ... shown by the following: (1)
Kellner immediately briefed media members on details of the
crash; (2) Kellner stated, on numerous occasions, he would learn
the cause of the crash to prevent future crashes; (3) Kellner sent
personal letters to Flight 1404 passengers after the crash; (4)
Kellner interviewed the deadheading pilots aboard Flight 1404
and personally awarded commendation plaques to crew and
flight members; and (5) Kellner, who serves on the Board of Di-
rectors for Air Transport Association of America ("ATA"), an air-
line industry organization dedicated to ensuring the safety of
airline passengers, has superior knowledge as to Continental's
implementation of ATA's policies. 25
4
Continental filed a motion for protective order in response to
the motion to compel, attaching an affidavit in which Kellner
testified that he had no unique or superior knowledge. 55
"The trial court granted the motion to compel Kellner's depo-
sition," but the Texas Court of Appeals reversed.256 Basing its
decision on Crown Central Petroleum Corp., the standard gov-
erning apex depositions, 257 the court found that Kellner "[did]
not have unique or superior knowledge regarding what oc-
curred before and during the accident or the cause of the acci-
dent. '258 The court found
251 An "apex" deposition is "the deposition of a corporate officer at the apex of
the corporate hierarchy." Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d
125, 126 (Tex. 1995).




256 Id. at 851, 859.
257 The Crown Central Petroleum Corp. guidelines apply "[w]hen a party seeks to
depose a corporate president or other high level corporate official and that offi-
cial (or the corporation) files a motion for protective order to prohibit the depo-
sition accompanied by the official's affidavit denying any knowledge of relevant
facts." Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1995).
258 In re Cont'l Airlines, 305 S.W.3d at 858.
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that the information [Kellner] gave at the press conference was
provided to him by other Continental employees; he provided
the name of the Continental employee who [was] its party repre-
sentative to the NTSB investigation; he did not discuss with the
deadheading pilots what occurred before, during, and after the
accident; he [did] not receive [ ] information about the cause of
the accident in the executive briefs; and he named the Continen-
tal employee who has direct responsibility for the implementa-
tion of operational and safety practices at Continental and serves
as Continental's representative on the ATA safety committee. 259
The court also found that "plaintiffs [did] not show[ ] that less
intrusive methods [were] inadequate to obtain the information
they [were] seeking. 260
VI. AIR FRANCE FLIGHT 4590
On December 6, 2010, a French court "found Continental
Airlines and one of its mechanics guilty of manslaughter in the
deaths of 113 people who perished in the crash of New York-
bound Air France" Flight 4590.261 The court found that "Conti-
nental and its mechanic improperly monitored and maintained
aircraft, resulting in a piece of titanium falling from a plane
onto a runway.. . a few minutes before" the Concorde jet took
off on July 25, 2000.262 The court "believed the roughly 16-inch
piece of metal known as a wear strip punctured a tire on the Air
France jet as it sped down the runway for takeoff, and that deb-
ris perforated the jet's low-lying fuel tank, causing a leak and a
fire. 263 Continental filed an appeal stating that "the ruling was
'absurd' and . . . aimed at deflecting blame from Air France,
operator of the Concorde. 264
CONCLUSION
We expect developments in air carrier litigation in 2011 to
hold particular interest for practitioners following the develop-
ment of Tokyo Convention and Montreal Convention jurispru-
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Devorah Lauter, Continental, Mechanic Guilty of Manslaughter in Concorde




264 Continental Appeals Concorde Crash Verdict, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Dec. 14,
2010, 1:20 PM), http://www.upi.com/TopNews/World-News/2010/12/14/
Continental-appeals-Concorde-crash-verdict/UPI-52411292350852/.
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dence and for operators and regulators of public use aircraft as
the FAA struggles to begin regulating air operations previously
controlled by other government agencies.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Atia v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 2d 693 (E.D. Ky. 2010)
Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008)
Cosgrove-Goodman v. UAL Corp., No. 10-CV-1908, 2010 WL
2197674 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2010)
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.
1995)
Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2004)
Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2010)
Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., No. 2:04-CV-01304-RCJ-(LRL), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45488 (D. Nev. June 15, 2006)
El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999)
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Air Express Int'l USA, Inc., 615 F.3d 1305 (11th
Cir. 2010)
Fedelich v. Am. Airlines, 724 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.P.R. 2010)
Garrisi v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. 10-12298, 2010 WL 3702374
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2010)
Ginsberg v. Am. Airlines, No. 09 Civ. 3226(LTS)(KNF), 2010
WL 3958843 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2010)
Houlihan v. Capital Airways, LLC, No. H-09-CV-0883, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 34612 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2010)
In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-
316-KSF, 2008 WL 2369785 (E.D. Ky. June 6, 2008)
In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-CV-
316-KSF, 2011 WL 350469 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2011)
In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 305 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2010, pet. granted)
In re Helicopter Crash Near Weaverville, Cal. 8/5/08, 714 F.
Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Or. 2010)
King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002)
Matveychuk v. Deutsche Lufthansa, AG, No. 08-CV-3108
(JG) (RML), 2010 WL 3540921 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010)
McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313 (1st Cir. 1995)
Memorandum - Decision and Order, Mercy Flight Central, Inc.
v. N.Y. Div. of State Police, No. 5:08-CV-1041-FJS-GHL
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2010) ECF 49.
[76226
2011] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS - AIR CARRIER
Nankin v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., No. CV 09-07851 MMM (RZx),
2010 WL 342632 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2010)
Narkiewicz-Laine v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 587 F. Supp. 2d
888 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004)
Op. and Order, In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006,
No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF (E.D. Ky. Apr. 2, 2010), ECF 3750
Op. and Order, In re Air Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006,
No. 5:06-CV-316-KSF (E.D. Ky. July 12, 2010), ECF 3812
Order, In reAir Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-
CV-316-KSF (E.D. Ky. July 12, 2010), ECF 3810
Order, In reAir Crash at Lexington, Ky., Aug. 27, 2006, No. 5:06-
CV-316-KSF (E.D. Ky. July 12, 2010), ECF 3811
Sompo Japan Ins., Inc. v. Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 522 F.3d
776 (7th Cir. 2008)
Weiss v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y.
2006)
Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1987)
STATUTES
49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (41) (A) (2006)
49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (41) (C) (2006)
49 U.S.C. § 40125(b) (2006)
49 U.S.C. § 44701 (2006)
49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006)
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.184 (West 2010)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Car-
riage by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, as
Amended by the protocol done at The Hague on 28 Sep-
tember 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in
Sec. Rep. No. 105-20
Brett Barrouquere, Judge: No Punitive Damages Against Comair in
Crash Case, CINCINNATI.COM (Feb. 2, 2011, 10:14 PM), http:/
/news.cincinnati.com/fdcp/?1297284116560
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Eid v. Alaska Air-
lines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 06-16457)
Continental Appeals Concorde Crash Verdict, UNITED PRESS INT'L




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMER CE
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for Interna-
tional Carriage by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 106-45 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2003)
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to In-
ternational Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct.
12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 U.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. § 40105 (2000)
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T.
2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969)
Deborah A.P. Hersman, Chairman, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd.,
Closing Statement at the Sunshine Meeting (Dec. 7, 2010),
available at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2010/Weaverville_
CA/closing-statement.htm
Devorah Lauter, Continental, Mechanic Guilty of Manslaughter in
Concorde Crash, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2010), http://articles.
latimes.com/2010/dec/07/world/la-fg-concorde-crash-rul-
ing-20101207
General Technical Administration, 3 § 3-565, (2011), available at
http://fsims.faa.gov/picresultsaspx?mode=EBookContents
(click "volume 3 General Technical Administration"
hyperlink)
HAI Public Aircraft Meeting -January 20, 2011, HELICOPTER ASS'N
INT'L, http://www.rotor.com/Operations/PublicAircraft
Meeting.aspx (last visited May 17, 2011)
John Allen, Dir., Flight Standards Serv., Public Aircraft Opera-
tions Forum (Jan. 20, 2011), available at http://www.rotor.
com/Operations/PublicAircraftMeeting.aspx (download
"FAA Public Aircraft Presentation.ppt" hyperlink).
NAT'L TRANsp. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT: CRASH
DURING TAKEOFF AT CARSON HELICOPTERS, INC., FIREFIGHT-
ING HELICOPTER UNDER CONTRACT TO THE U.S. FOREST SER-
VICE, SIKORSKY S-61N, N612AZ, NEAR WEAVERVILLE,
CALIFORNIA, AUGUST 5, 2008 (2010), available at http://
ntsb.gov/publictn/2010/AAR1006.pdf
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Eid, No.
10-962 (filed Jan. 24, 2011), 2011 WL 291136
Public Meeting of December 7, 2010, Executive Summay, NAT'L
TRANsp. SAFETY BD., http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2010/
AAR1006.htm (last visited May 16, 2011)
[76228
